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CIVIL WAR OVERVIEW

By Margaret Greene Rogers


Corinth, at the junction of the Memphis and Charleston and the Mobile and Ohio Railroads, was recognized by both Confederate and Federal commanders as being of such strategic importance that the village was occupied by one or the other of the forces from 1861 to 1865.

The resident population of the little town was 1,200; yet it boasted five churches, Corona College, three large hotels, numerous businesses and a number of fine homes.

During 1861 Corinth was a mobilization center for Confederate troops moving to Mobile, Alabama; Pensacola, Florida; Virginia; and Bowling Green, Kentucky. Early in 1862, Gen. A. S. Johnston, Commander of the Confederate Army in the West, charged Gen. P. G. T. Beauregard with the responsibility of assembling troops in Corinth. New Orleans and northern Arkansas were abandoned and the coastal defenses at Pensacola, Mobile, and Charleston were stripped.

Union Gen. W. H. Halleck ordered Federal forces to concentrate at Pittsburg Landing on the Tennessee River in preparation for an attack on the northeast Mississippi village of Corinth.

Early in April Gen. Johnston decided to strike the Federal forces rather than let them attack Corinth. The two-day battle named for Shiloh Church ensued. On the second day the CSA forces retreated to Corinth. Corinth became a vast hospital center. Despite the fact that more than half of the 112,000 CSA army were either wounded or sick, fortifications on the eastern and northern approaches to the city were constructed.

Late in April, the Union armies, numbering 128,315 effectives, began inching and entrenching their way toward Corinth. By late May they were outside the new fortifications. In Corinth, Beauregard, without siege guns, outnumbered and facing shortages of food and water, called a conference with his generals. Their decision was to fall back down the Mobile and Ohio Railroad to Tupelo, Mississippi. The evacuation of Corinth was conducted with such secrecy that the Federals were completely fooled. When they moved into Corinth on May 30th, they found an empty town.

Gen. Halleck began dispersing his army and building additional fortifications. Batteries A through F were constructed on the southern and western sides of town. Later in the summer an inner line of five batteries was erected.

In July CSA Gen. Braxton Bragg, who had replaced Beauregard as commander, moved to Chattanooga, Tennessee, leaving Generals Earl Van Dorn and Sterling Price in Mississippi. Van Dorn moved southward; Price remained in the northern section to keep an eye on Gen. U. S. Grant. Following the Battle of Iuka, Mississippi, in September, Grant moved to Jackson, Tennessee, leaving Gen. Wm.S.Rosecrans with four divisions in Corinth. Rosecrans ordered the inner batteries connected by breastworks and covered with abatis. Work continued on Battery Powell, the only inner battery on the north.

Late in September, Van Dorn and Price met at Ripley, Mississippi, and decided to retake Corinth. Van Dorn's division under Gen. Mansfield Lovell led the way northward followed by Price's two divisions under Dabney Maury and Louis Hebert. Just south of Pocahontas, Tennessee, they turned eastward, repaired bridges over the Hatchie and Tuscumbia Rivers and continued to Chewalla, Tennessee where they camped for the night of October 2nd.

Next morning Lovell's Division crossed the Memphis and Charleston Railroad and advanced against a hill honey-combed with rifle pits containing sharp shooters and crowned with artillery. The division took the hill. Union forces retreated to Battery F only to be routed by two of Maury's brigades. Price's two divisions advanced against the Union troops behind the old CSA fortifications and forced them back. When night came, the Confederates were within 700 yards of the inner line of batteries.

The fighting on October 4th, was fierce and vicious. Brigades from Hebert's and Maury's Divisions broke through the Federal line east of the Mobile and Ohio Railroad. Their assault carried them to the intersection of the railroads. There they were met by Union reserves and were forced to withdraw.

In front of Robinett, Maury's brigades advanced through the abatis into withering fire from the battery's cannon. Col. William P. Rogers of the 2nd Texas led their third assault. As he reached the parapet, he was killed and the Confederates began retreating. South of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad Lovell had skirmished but never advanced. He was ordered to cover the CSA retreat. By 2:00 p.m. the battle was over.

Rosecrans reported Federal losses 315 killed, 1,812 wounded, and 232 prisoners or missing; Confederate losses 1,423 killed, 5,692 wounded and 2,268 prisoners.

Federal forces continued to garrison Corinth until January 24th, 1864. When they left, they burned the college and destroyed other public buildings.

During the ensuing months CSA Gen. N.B. Forrest repaired the Mobile and Ohio tracks to Corinth and the Memphis and Charleston tracks to Tuscumbia, Alabama. CSA Hood's army came from Tuscumbia to Corinth in January 1865. Before they moved on to Tupelo, they burned the Tishomingo Hotel in Corinth.

A conservative estimate of troops stationed in or around Corinth during the war years numbers over 300,000. At least 200 Confederate or Federal generals were in Corinth and over 100 skirmishes and/or raids occurred in the area.

 


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"This material is based upon work assisted by a grant from the Department of Interior, National Park Service.  Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of the Interior."